Illusion of explanatory depth
We think we understand how things work far better than we actually do.
What it means
The illusion of explanatory depth is the systematic overestimation of how well one understands the causal workings of everyday objects, systems, and policies. When asked to rate their understanding, then to produce a detailed mechanistic explanation, and then to rate again, people's confidence drops sharply, because the demand to explain exposes gaps that introspection had concealed. The illusion arises partly from confusing the availability of a vague gist or a working object with possessing a genuine mechanistic model, and from outsourcing knowledge to others and the world. It is specific to explanatory, causal knowledge rather than facts or procedures, and forcing mechanistic explanation can also moderate political extremity. It is a humbling, practically useful check against overconfidence in complex domains.
Examples
Most people are confident they know how a zipper or a flush toilet works until asked to explain it step by step, whereupon their confidence collapses.
Ask someone certain about a tariff to spell out, step by step, who pays it and how prices move. The certainty usually softens — and so, often, does the position.
Nearly everyone taps a bank card daily; almost nobody can say how the money actually travels from their account to the shop's. The gap only appears when you try to explain it.
First described in Rozenblit & Keil (2002).