Risky-choice framing
A gain frame makes us play it safe; a loss frame makes us gamble.
What it means
The original framing effect, in which choices between a sure option and a risky option of equal expected value reverse depending on whether the outcomes are described as gains or as losses. When framed as gains (lives saved, money kept), people are risk-averse and prefer the certain option; when the identical outcomes are framed as losses (lives lost, money forgone), people become risk-seeking and prefer the gamble. The reversal is a direct prediction of prospect theory: the value function is concave for gains and convex for losses, so the curvature flips with the reference point that the frame establishes. It is the canonical violation of description invariance — the principle that logically equivalent descriptions should yield the same choice — and it matters because the way a decision is worded, often arbitrarily, can flip people between caution and risk-taking on the same underlying facts.
Examples
In the 'Asian disease' problem, people choose the certain option to 'save 200 of 600' but the gamble when the same outcome is framed as '400 will die.'
A saver told a fund 'locks in £8,000 of your £10,000' takes the sure thing; told it 'loses £2,000,' the same person reaches for the volatile fund and a shot at breaking even.
A product lead told a fix 'retains 30 percent of at-risk customers' takes the safe patch; told it 'still loses 70 percent,' she bets the quarter on a risky rebuild.
First described in Tversky & Kahneman (1981).