Pragmatic reasoning schemas
We reason with learned rule-packages about permissions and obligations, not bare logic.
What it means
Pragmatic reasoning schemas are clusters of abstract but content-sensitive rules, induced from recurring life experiences, that govern reasoning about goal-relevant domains such as permissions, obligations, and causation. The permission schema — 'if an action is to be taken, a precondition must be satisfied' — explains why people reason correctly about conditional rules framed as permissions while failing structurally identical abstract versions. Unlike formal logic, these schemas are tied to pragmatic content, yet unlike memorized cases they generalize across superficially different situations sharing the same deontic structure. They offer a middle path in the rationality debate between pure logic and purely domain-specific evolved modules, and they account for facilitation effects without invoking cheater detection. The construct shows reasoning competence as a repertoire of useful, experience-built schemas.
Examples
Checking the 'if you're served alcohol, you must show ID' rule, people correctly inspect the under-age drinker and the no-ID drinker, applying a permission schema they never apply to abstract letters.
New staff instantly grasp 'you can expense a taxi only if you worked past nine,' checking the late claims and the taxi receipts — the same people stall on identical if-then puzzles about symbols.
A parent enforcing 'you can have screen time if your homework is done' knows exactly who to check — the child on the tablet and the one with unfinished homework.
First described in Cheng & Holyoak (1985).